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How does globalization affect politics? One of the most controversial aspects of globalization is offshoring, when
manufacturing operations and business functions move abroad. Although voters generally dislike offshoring, it remains
unclear how the movement of jobs abroad impacts democratic elections. Using a difference-in-differences estimation
strategy, I find incumbent government parties lose more votes in municipalities where a local plant moved production
abroad between elections than in municipalities without such an event. This result holds across various time periods,
different incumbent parties, and diverse types of elections. In both national and regional elections, voters punish incumbent
government parties when a local firm moves production abroad. Incumbent parties’ vote shares fall as the number of jobs
lost due to offshoring increases. In multi-party governments, voters disproportionately punish the largest coalition party
for offshoring. Results from an original survey in Spain verify the importance of offshoring for voters’ retrospective
evaluation of incumbents.
How does globalization affect politics? One of the most salient aspects of modern-day
globalization is offshoring, when firms move their manufacturing operations or business functions
abroad.1 In fact, when asked what globalization brings to mind, forty-five percent of European
respondents said they think about the offshoring of jobs to countries with cheap labor.2 Despite
offshoring’s salience to voters, it remains unclear how this controversial facet of globalization
impacts democratic politics. In this study, I investigate how offshoring influences both national
and regional elections.
Voters generally dislike offshoring. Ninety-five percent of US respondents oppose businesses’
decisions to move manufacturing operations abroad (Mansfield and Mutz 2013). Voters may
dislike offshoring because of its negative economic consequences. When firms relocate production
abroad, people lose their jobs. Workers laid off because of offshoring experience significant
economic hardships (e.g. Bachmann and Braun 2011; Görg and Hanley 2005; OECD 2007).
Offshored workers tend to have different age and skill profiles than other unemployed persons
and these characteristics lower their chances of obtaining new jobs under similar conditions
(Miguélez Lobo 2004). Beyond individuals directly impacted by a plant closure, offshoring also
entails negative economic consequences for the local community. When a local factory closes to
move production abroad, workers in auxiliary companies and local suppliers may also be laid off.
Wages in the local economy subsequently fall as jobs become scarcer and as a result, local real
estate values decrease, young people leave the area, and social services decline (e.g. OECD 2007;
Frieden 2018).
Although voters generally dislike offshoring, it is unclear - from a theoretical perspective -
what effect offshoring may have on voting behaviour. A sizable literature on retrospective voting
documents a pattern, at the aggregate level, whereby voters tend to punish the incumbent for
poor national economic performance during their time in office (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier
1In the academic literature, there are primarily two notions of offshoring (Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2017).
The first refers to moving certain tasks in the production process overseas. The second is when a company relocates
production abroad for reasons of comparative advantage. The second concept applies here.
2European Commission (2005) Eurobarometer 63, question Q6.
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2000; Anderson 2007). However, we know relatively little about the extent to which the personal
experience of a local economic shock brings about an anti-incumbent vote (Margalit 2019,
pp. 287). When voters experience a negative economic shock because of offshoring, they may
vote against the incumbent in the subsequent election.
On the other hand, however, offshoring may have no effect on voters’ choice at the ballot
box. Voters may see offshoring as an inevitable consequence of globalization - one over which
the government has little influence. If voters believe governments in a highly globalized world
have limited ability to sway firms’ decisions about production locations, they may discount or
even ignore offshoring events in their retrospective evaluations of incumbents. The high level of
international economic integration that makes offshoring possible may also serve to reduce the
importance of economic-based issues for voters’ decisions by reducing governments’ room to
maneuver in policy-making (e.g. Samuels and Hellwig 2010; Hellwig 2014, 2001).3
Precisely how offshoring affects democratic elections is ultimately an empirical question.
I address this question here in one of the first studies to directly measure offshoring and its
electoral consequences. I find that voters punish incumbents for local offshoring events. Using
a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I show that incumbent government parties lose
more votes in municipalities where local production moved abroad between elections than in
municipalities without such an event. This result holds for elections in various years (2000, 2003,
2004, 2006, 2008, 2011), for different incumbent parties (i.e. socialist and center-right parties),
and for different levels of government. In both national and regional elections, voters punish
incumbent government parties for offshoring and parties’ vote shares fall as the number of jobs lost
due to offshoring increases. Voters punish parties from both the left and the right of the ideological
spectrum for offshoring. In multi-party coalition governments, voters disproportionately punish
the largest party for offshoring. An original survey verifies the importance of offshoring for voters’
decisions at the ballot box.
This study makes several contributions. First, it examines the impact of an important facet
of globalization on elections in a context other than the United States. This is noteworthy because
most evidence connecting globalization to democratic elections comes from the US (e.g. Healy
and Malhotra 2013; Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2017; Feigenbaum and Hall 2015; Autor
et al. 2016; Margalit 2011, 2019). However, results from the United States may not generalize
to countries with different electoral institutions. America’s institutions, which include plurality
electoral rules and single-member districts, maximize leaders’ accountability to voters (Lijphart
1984, 2012). Accountability exists when there is clarity of responsibility for political outcomes,
and voters can effectively sanction those responsible for the outcomes (Powell 2000). Plurality
electoral systems tend to score highly on these criteria. It is therefore unsurprising that previous
studies find evidence that American voters punish incumbents for negative economic shocks.
Observing similar behavior in a country with different electoral institutions is more unexpected.
Voters in countries with proportional electoral rules find it relatively more difficult to hold
elected leaders to account for negative economic shocks. Proportional electoral rules (PR)
prioritize representation over accountability. There is relatively less clarity of responsibility for
political outcomes and voters find it more difficult to effectively sanction those responsible for the
outcomes in PR systems (e.g. Lijphart 1984; Powell 2000; Lijphart 2012). In proportional systems
with closed-lists, for example, voters can only cast their vote for a political party; they cannot
vote for an individual candidate. As a result, voters cannot punish individually the parliamentary
representative(s) from their own district when a local plant closes to move abroad. Because
3See Kayser (2007) for a comprehensive discussion of this literature.
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some countries’ electoral institutions make it relatively more difficult for voters to hold leaders
accountable for economic shocks, globalization may have different electoral impacts in different
countries.
I investigate how offshoring impacts elections in Spain - a country with proportional electoral
rules, multi-member districts, and closed party lists. Because these institutions make it relatively
more difficult for voters to hold elected leaders to account for negative economic shocks, Spain is
arguably a hard case in which to find an impact of offshoring on elections.4 Yet, I find evidence
that Spanish voters punish incumbent government parties for offshoring. They do so even when
faced with a multi-party coalition government, which increases the difficulty of assigning blame
for negative economic shocks (Duch and Stevenson 2013).
These results show that the electoral consequences of globalization extend beyond the United
States to countries with different electoral institutions. This is an important finding because the
evaluation of incumbent performance at the ballot box plays a key role in democratic accountability
(e.g. Ashworth 2012; Besley 2006). Even in a democracy with less majoritarian institutions than
the United States, voters nevertheless hold incumbents accountable for offshoring.
Second, this study contributes new evidence to understanding how globalization affects
voter behavior in multilevel polities. Most previous studies focus exclusively on globalization’s
impact on national elections (e.g. Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2017; Autor et al. 2016).5 In
contrast, I investigate both national and regional elections. I find novel evidence that voters punish
incumbent parties for offshoring in regional elections, as well as national ones. This finding
suggests that by examining only national elections, previous studies may have underestimated the
total electoral impact of globalization.
Finally, this study provides novel causal evidence linking offshoring to elections. Despite
the large body of scholarship on the political consequences of globalization, the impact of
offshoring has remained largely unexamined to date. Previous studies focus instead on other
facets of globalization, such as import shocks (e.g. Colantone and Stanig 2018; Jensen, Quinn,
and Weymouth 2017; Autor et al. 2016) and foreign direct investment (FDI) (e.g. Owen 2018).
This omission is surprising given that offshoring is one of the most salient and controversial
aspects of modern-day globalization. It is problematic because the distributional consequences of
offshoring differ from international trade (Owen 2017) and therefore, the impact of import shocks
on voting behavior may differ from the impact of offshoring.
The lack of research on offshoring’s electoral effects is likely due to the difficulty of
identifying offshoring events and quantifying the number of jobs lost because of firms’ decisions
to move production abroad. Unlike imports or FDI, no single authoritative source of data on
offshoring exists. Previous studies consequently sidestep the challenge of identifying offshoring
events and instead use indirect proxies. In contrast, I collect novel data on offshoring events
and job losses due to offshoring using multiple, diverse sources of information. These data
allow for an investigation of how actual offshoring events affect real-world voting behavior. This
investigation contributes new evidence to debates at the heart of democratic representation, such
as what outcomes voters hold politicians accountable for in an era of hyper-globalization (Rodrik
2011).
4However, see Field (2016) for an alternative perspective.
5Owen (2018) is a notable exception. In an innovative study, she examines the impact of foreign direct investment on
mayoral elections in Brazil.
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Connecting Offshoring to Voting
Surveys show voters generally dislike offshoring (e.g. Mansfield and Mutz 2013). But how does
offshoring influence voters’ decisions at the ballot box? I contend there are several reasons why
a local offshoring event may engender an anti-incumbent vote. First, offshoring entails real
economic costs. When firms relocate production abroad, people lose their jobs. Workers laid off
because of offshoring experience a deterioration of their personal economic circumstances (e.g.
Bachmann and Braun 2011; Görg and Hanley 2005; OECD 2007). Offshored workers tend to
have different age and skill profiles than other unemployed persons and these characteristics lower
their chances of obtaining new jobs under similar conditions (Koeber and Wright 2001). In Spain,
for example, workers fired because of offshoring tend to be middle-aged (Miguélez Lobo 2004).
For them, the possibility of retraining to obtain jobs under similar conditions is relatively limited
and, as a result, many workers made redundant by offshoring end up accepting worse pay and/or
temporary jobs (Miguélez Lobo 2004). As a result, the real earnings losses from offshoring
are often significant (Michael and Michael 2012). Voters who see their real earnings decline
because of offshoring may subsequently vote against the incumbent as a result of "pocketbook"
considerations.
The negative pocketbook effects of offshoring extend beyond the workers at the affected
plant. When firms move production abroad, workers employed at auxiliary companies and local
suppliers, some of which will be losing their main customer, may also be laid off. For example, the
offshoring of production from Braun’s plant in Esplugues de Llobregat, Spain to China resulted in
690 direct job losses. But estimates suggest that a further 1,500 jobs, connected to Braun’s plant
via its network of local providers and other services, were also eliminated because of Braun’s
decision to move production abroad.6 These 1,500 jobs were cut as an indirect consequence of
offshoring but the workers who were fired nevertheless experienced real earning losses as a result.
These workers may vote against the incumbent government party in the next election as a result
of offshoring’s indirect pocketbook effects.
Direct and indirect job losses from offshoring negatively impact the local community. When
factories that used to provide decent paying jobs move abroad and local suppliers reduce their
work force, wages in the local labor market fall (Ebenstein et al. 2014; Hummels et al. 2014).
As jobs become scarcer, unemployment rises and mobile inhabitants leave the area in search of
better wages and employment opportunities (Biscourp and Kramarz 2007; Amiti and Wei 2009).
Over time, local income and property values fall, which leads to a decline in local-government tax
revenue, and a deterioration of local public services (Feler and Senses 2017). The erosion of a
community’s economic base may also have negative social effects, including a rise in alcoholism
and opioid abuse (Frieden 2018; Dean and Kimmel 2019; Eisen et al. 2020).
Given the negative impact of offshoring on the local area, people in the affected community
may vote against the incumbent government following a local offshoring event.7 They may do so
because: 1) their own economic fortunes decline along with the region’s; or as a result of 2) local
sociotropism. Local sociotropism refers to the idea that voters are concerned about the economic
6https://elpais.com/diario/2006/05/20/economia/1148076003_850215.html
7Although I focus here on the negative economic impacts of offshoring on local communities, offshoring may have
varied effects at the individual level. While some individuals suffer economic losses as a result of offshoring, others in the
same country may gain economically, particularly in the long-run. Exactly who wins and loses from offshoring at the
individual level is the subject of a growing body of research. See, for example, Owen (2017) and Owen and Johnston
(2017).
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well-being of their community and not simply their own personal financial situation (e.g. Alkon
2017; Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck 2011). Research shows that voters often consider the interests of
others when formulating their attitudes about economic policies and the governments responsible
for them (e.g. Mansfield and Mutz 2013, 2009; Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter 2012). Individuals
predominantly care about the well-being of those closest to themselves, including their family,
neighbors, and local community. Because individuals have a social, material, and psychological
stake in their communities (e.g. Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck 2011; Ansolabehere, Meredith, and
Snowberg 2014), the closure of a local firm to move abroad, and its knock-on effects for the
surrounding area, may influence peoples’ voting behavior. In a community hit by offshoring,
people may cast an anti-incumbent vote out of a sense of “place-based” threat – even if the voter
herself is not personally hurt by offshoring (Cramer 2016).
The local sociotropism mechanism requires that voters not directly affected by a plant closure
nevertheless know about it. Knowledge of offshoring appears to be relatively widespread. In Spain,
for example, forty-one percent of respondents in an original survey of a nationally-representative
sample said they knew someone personally who had lost their job because a business had closed
to move abroad.8 Thirty-two percent said they had heard about a business in their local area
moving abroad.
Knowledge of offshoring events may be relatively common because firms’ decisions to move
production abroad tend to be reported in the media and in Spain these reports often trigger public
protests. In early 2002, for example, the US-owned multinational, Lear, announced the closure of
its electrical components plant in Cervera, Spain. The announcement led to protests attended
by over 4,000 people including the plant’s workforce of 1,200 employees and local trade union
members (Miguélez Lobo 2004). Similarly, in January 2003, more than 2,000 people protested
the offshoring of production from the Moulinex factory in Barbastro, Spain to China, which
resulted in 150 job losses.9
This is not to suggest that the informed but personally unaffected voters have a sophisticated
model of the distributional impact of offshoring. It is simply to propose that voters typically know
when their communities are doing poorly and that offshoring probably played some role in the
problem (Frieden 2018). Both personal pocketbook considerations and sociotropic attitudes may
lead voters to cast an anti-incumbent vote following a local offshoring event.
The extent of the anti-incumbent vote will depend on how much blame voters attribute to
the government for offshoring. Voters may believe that governments can keep firms onshore by
providing subsidies and/or tax breaks to firms. Elected leaders themselves often espouse this
view - using the threat of offshoring to justify generous subsidies and tax incentives for firms
(Jofre-Monseny, Sánchez-Vidal, and Viladecans-Marsal 2018). Voters may observe governments
providing firms with economic incentives and firms subsequently deciding to stay in the country.
In Spain, for example, voters saw the government provide lucrative subsidies to the Seat and Ford
automotive plants in Barcelona and Valencia respectively to keep them onshore (Jofre-Monseny,
Sánchez-Vidal, and Viladecans-Marsal 2018). Having observed this, voters may conclude that
governments can keep firms onshore by providing them with sufficient economic incentives. If
8The survey was administered online to 1,000 respondents by Netquest in October 2018. The sample was selected
using age, gender, and province quotas in order to ensure a nationally representative sample. The exact survey questions
(in English) are provided in the Appendix.
9https://www.diariocordoba.com/noticias/economia/rechazo-ajuste-empleo-moulinex_37789.
html
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voters believe offshoring can be averted by government action, they may punish incumbents for
their perceived inaction when they observe a local plant moving production abroad.
In contrast, if voters think governments have little influence over firms’ location decisions,
they may not hold incumbents responsible for offshoring. Voters may believe offshoring is
an inevitable consequence of globalization - one over which the government has little control.
Offshoring occurs precisely when levels of international economic integration are high. High
levels of integration reduce governments’ room to maneuver in policy making and prior research
suggests that voters recognize the constrains imposed by globalization on governments (e.g.
Samuels and Hellwig 2010; Hellwig 2014, 2001; Kayser 2007). Voters in countries with very open
economies tend to hold their governments less responsible for the nation’s economic performance,
for example (e.g. Samuels and Hellwig 2010; Hellwig 2014, 2001; Kayser 2007). If voters
believe that governments in a highly globalized world have little ability to sway firms’ decisions
about production locations, they may discount or even ignore offshoring in their retrospective
evaluations of incumbents.
Research Design
Taken together, these mechanisms suggest a testable hypothesis:
Areas that experience a local offshoring event will return fewer votes for the incumbent
government party in the subsequent election than areas that did not experience an offshoring
event.
I test this hypothesis using evidence from Spain. Spain experienced a wave of offshoring
beginning in the early 2000s. During this period, the Spanish economy was strong. It grew at
4 percent a year on average from 2000-2006 and enjoyed lower unemployment rates than other
European countries (OECD 2007).
The surge of offshoring in Spain occurred for two main reasons. First, the pending expansion
of the European Union (EU) would bring ten new countries into the EU in 2004. Many of the
new member-states had lower labor costs than Spain who, during this period, had neither very
low pay nor very high innovation. In 2004, the average annual earnings per worker in Spain was
17,547 US dollars. In contrast, the average annual earnings per worker in Poland was just 5,513
US dollars. Spain’s wage levels and intermediate position in the global division of labor led firms
to move their manufacturing operations abroad. The Spanish automobile components sector, for
example, lost 20 percent of its workforce to central and eastern European countries between 2002
and 2005 (Miguélez Lobo 2004).
Second, the strength of Spain’s economy during the early 2000s made it relatively less
attractive to cost-conscious firms. Because firms’ location decisions are driven primarily by
production costs (e.g. Helpman 1984; OECD 2007), they have incentives to leave a country when
its economy is doing well. Wages and rents tend to rise in growing economies, which makes the
country less attractive as a place of production. Companies may subsequently consider moving
production to a lower-cost country precisely when their host country’s economy is growing
strongly. For example, the Danish firm Vestas decided to close its plant in the Spanish municipality
of León, which produced wind turbines for the global market, and relocate production to China in
order to save money on labor and other production costs.
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Data
I identify the manufacturing-sector offshoring events that occurred in Spain from 2000 to 2011.10
These novel data are an important innovation and represent one of only a handful of attempts to
directly measure offshoring. Previous studies sidestep the challenge of identifying offshoring
events and instead adopt one of two strategies.11 First, some studies assume that individuals with
certain occupations or skills face a higher risk of seeing their jobs offshored (e.g. Owen and
Johnston 2017; Chase 2008; Owen 2017; Rommel and Walter 2017). While innovative, these
occupational and skill-based measures indicate only the number of potential job losses rather
than the number of actual jobs lost due to offshoring. As such, these measures are inappropriate
for investigating how the experience of a local offshoring event affects politics.
A second, frequently-employed strategy is to investigate public opinion data. Using survey
data, prior studies examine how respondents perceive offshoring (Mansfield and Mutz 2013) and
how vulnerability to offshoring correlates with expressed trade policy preferences (Owen and
Johnston 2017) and self-reported political party preferences (Rommel and Walter 2017). While
these studies are valuable, it remains largely unknown how self-reported preferences translate into
actual voting behavior (Margalit 2013, 2019). As such, knowing the effects of offshoring - or more
precisely, the risk of offshoring - on preferences may not be particularly helpful for explaining
actual voting behavior. Margalit (2013), for example, finds a strong impact of economic shocks
on attitudes towards welfare spending but no effects on actual voting behavior. It is therefore
important to investigate the impact of genuine offshoring events on real-world voting behavior.
To do this, I collect data on offshoring events in Spain using multiple sources. I build on
Jofre-Monseny, Sánchez-Vidal, and Viladecans-Marsal (2018) who use data from Myro-Sánchez
and Fernández-Otheo (2008) and balance sheet data from the Sistema de Análisis de Balances
Ibéricos (SABI) to identify offshoring events. I confirm the details of each of these offshoring
events using Spanish newspapers, data from Bronfenbrenner and Luce (2004), and data from the
European Restructuring Monitor (ERM). I include an offshoring event in my dataset only if the
details of the event are confirmed by at least two sources. For each offshoring event, I identify the
plant’s exact geographic location and record the number of jobs lost as a direct result of the move
abroad.
Using these novel, geo-located data, I construct two groups: 1) a group of "treated"
municipalities that experienced job losses due to offshoring between two elections; and 2) a
control group that did not. In addition to this binary treatment indicator, I also construct an
“intensity of treatment" indicator that reports the number of job losses in a municipality that
occurred as a direct result of offshoring between two elections.
I use municipalities as my unit of analysis because of offshoring’s strong local effects.
People living near a shuttered plant experience the economic fallout from offshoring (Holl 2004).
Some people in the local area lose their jobs directly as a result of production moving abroad.
Others lose their jobs indirectly. And when local factories that used to provide decent paying
jobs move production abroad, the surrounding areas experience increased unemployment, lower
labor force participation, and outmigration by mobile inhabitants (Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth
2019; Frieden 2018). Given its local economic impacts, offshoring’s electoral consequences are
most appropriately measured at the community level and for this reason, my unit of analysis is
municipalities. Spanish municipalities are relatively small; the average municipality in my sample
10During this period, offshoring in Spain was largely concentrated in manufacturing (OECD 2007).
11For a notable exception, however, see Margalit (2011).
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has a population of less than 24,000 people. Additionally, municipalities broadly approximate
local labor markets. Most people live and work in the same municipality. In fact, sixty percent of
the respondents in my survey reported that they worked in the same municipality in which they
lived.
Empirical Model
Given the myriad possible correlates of incumbent vote shares, I use a difference-in-differences
estimation strategy. The difference-in-differences estimator does not require the voting preferences
in both groups of municipalities to be the same. Rather than comparing both groups directly at
a particular point in time, the estimator instead compares the change in voting choices by both
groups over time, which helps to rule out alternative explanations. If offshoring occurs between
two elections and this event has an influence on voting decisions, a change in the voting patterns
in treated municipalities will be observed but not in control municipalities.
I conduct several tests using various elections throughout the period from 2000 to 2011,
including both national and regional elections. Reassuringly, the main result is consistent across
all tests; incumbent government parties lose votes in areas that experienced an offshoring event
relative to ares that did not. The negative effect of offshoring on incumbents’ vote shares is not
specific to any given election, political party, or time period.
In my first test, I examine election years t = (2000, 2004). National parliamentary elections
in these years span the early wave of offshoring and exclude the 2008 global financial crisis, which
hit Spain’s economy hard. Prior to the 2008 crisis, Spain enjoyed the largest period of economic
growth since the democratic transition (Fernández-Albertos, Kuo, and Balcells 2013). This fact
helps to distinguish the effects of offshoring from poor national economic performance.
I focus on election returns in Catalonia’s 943 municipalities. Because of Spain’s economic
geography, most of the offshoring events took place in Catalonia.12. Catalonia is Spain’s most
industrial region and while all of Catalonia’s municipalities experienced job losses during this
period, some experienced job losses due to offshoring. In untreated municipalities, job losses
were due to things other than offshoring including bad management and labor market churn. The
untreated municipalities are therefore most correctly described as municipalities that experience
job losses for reasons other than offshoring. In contrast, treated municipalities experience job
losses due to offshoring.
Focusing on Catalonia provides for a comparison of more alike municipalities. Catalan
municipalities are more similar to one another, on average, than they are to municipalities in
other regions of Spain, such as Extremadura. In recent years, for example, a strong independence
movement has arisen in Catalonia. While the issue of independence was not absent from politics
during the period under investigation here, it was far from the most salient political cleavage. Prior
to 2006, relatively few people wanted independence for Catalonia. Just 15 percent of Catalans
supported independence in 2006 (Hierro and Queralt 2020). The dramatic increase in support for
independence took place only after 2010 when a decision by the Spanish Constitutional Court
helped to fuel the pro-independence movement (Hierro and Queralt 2020). By 2013, support
for independent had risen to nearly 50 percent (Hierro and Queralt 2020). The dramatic rise in
pro-independence sentiment is one important reason why my sample excludes elections after
2011. If, however, the economic vote is diluted in Catalonia by the issue of independence during
12On the political consequences of economic geography, see Rickard (2012, 2018)
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my period, it would bias against finding any systematic effect of offshoring on incumbents’ vote
shares. As a robustness test, I examine voting patterns across the entire country and find similar
results, as discussed below.
For each municipality, I calculate the change in the incumbent government party’s vote
shares between the 2000 and 2004 elections. This electoral outcome is theoretically appropriate
given Spain’s closed-list elections where voters choose a political party rather than an individual
candidate at the ballot box. In the 2004 election, voters had to decide whether to vote for the
incumbent government party Partido Popular (PP). PP is a center-right party that is broadly
conservative in orientation and its economic policies are generally pro-market.
LetY1it andY0it indicate the pair of potential vote shares that the incumbent government party
attains in municipality i at time t when exposed to the treatment or the control condition between
the two elections. The quantity of interest is the electoral effect of offshoring, which is defined
as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) given by U =  [.18, C − .08, C | 8 = 1] .
This measures the average difference between the posttreatment vote shares that the affected
municipalities attain with and without the treatment. Since it is not possible to observe
 [.08, C | 8 = 1], I estimate the potential outcome based on the usual difference-in-differences
assumption of parallel trends. To assess the empirical validity of the parallel trends assumption, I
examine whether the PP vote share in municipalities affected by offshoring between the 2000
and 2004 elections followed a similar trend to the control municipalities in the years prior to
the treatment. The trends are, in fact, parallel, as illustrated in Appendix Figure A-1. I assume
 [.08, C − .08, (C − 1) | 8 = 1] =  [.08, C − .08, (C − 1) | 8 = 0] where t-1 equals the year of
the most recent previous election. Based on this assumption, the ATT is identified from observed
outcomes as: U = ( [.8, C | 8 = 1] −  [.8, C − 1 | 8 = 1]) − ( [.8, C | 8 = 0] −  [.8, C − 1 |
8 = 0).
I estimate U using a standard fixed effects regression given by: .8C = a8+XC+U8C+j8CV+n8C
where Yit is the incumbent government party’s vote share in municipality i at time t. ai is a
municipality-level fixed effect to control for any time-invariant unobserved factors, Xt is a period
fixed effect to control for common trends, U is the treatment effect, Dit is the treatment variable,
and n is an idiosyncratic error term clustered by municipality. Xit is a vector of time-varying
covariates including a constant. I first present the main results without time varying covariates
(except a constant). I then add the following control variables, all of which are measured at
the municipality level: population, unemployment, and economic growth. Data come from the
Statistical Institute of Catalonia.13
Results
Table 1 reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the electoral effect of offshoring, as
measured by the change in the incumbent government party’s vote shares between the 2000
and 2004 national elections. The negative coefficient on the time period variable (Post Period)
13The unemployment data measure the registered number of unemployed persons at 31 March of the reference year. I
use all of the data available at the municipality level. Unfortunately, not all variables are available for all municipalities
and their inclusion in the model reduces the sample size.
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table 1: Effect of offshoring on incumbent vote shares, by municipality 2000-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable = PP vote share
Treatment (offshoring event) -1.947 -1.636 -1.518 -1.340
(0.463) (0.423) (0.468) (0.540)
Post period -6.131 -7.000 -6.940 -6.807
(0.121) (0.224) (0.336) (0.426)
Population (thousands) 0.035 0.031 0.026
(0.036) (0.039) (0.044)
Unemployment rate -0.196 -0.085
(0.498) (0.552)
Economic growth rate 0.040
(0.025)
Constant 17.372 20.783 21.323 20.591
(0.060) (0.767) (1.722) (1.975)
Observations 1885 378 378 333
R-squared 0.736 0.911 0.911 0.906
Number of municipalities 943 200 200 179
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
demonstrates that the incumbent government party lost votes, on average, between the 2000 and
2004 elections.14 However, their losses were relatively greater in treated municipalities.
The estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is statistically significant (with a
t-statistic of 4.2) and realistic in substantive terms. Estimated treatment effects range from -1.34 to
-1.95 percentage points across the four models. The largest estimated treatment effect is observed
in model 1. Model 2 introduces a measure of municipalities’ population as a control variable.
In model 3, the unemployment rate is added as an additional control variable. Controlling for
unemployment helps to isolate the electoral impact of jobs lost due to offshoring. Controlling for
unemployment, the incumbent government party’s vote shares fall in response to job losses due to
offshoring. In model 4, the economic growth rate is added. Although the addition of each control
variable reduces the magnitude of the average treatment effect, the ATT remains negatively signed
and statistically significant at at least the 95 percent level in all four models. The incumbent
government party’s vote share fell by 1.6 percentage points in treated municipalities, on average
across all four models, which constitutes approximately a 15 percent decrease compared to the
overall PP vote share in Catalonia in 2004.
Not all offshoring events are equal; some generate more job losses than others. To address
this fact, I construct an "intensity of treatment" indicator that measures the number of jobs lost
as a direct result of offshoring in a given municipality between two elections. The results are
14This may be because three days before the 2004 election ten bombs exploded on four commuter trains heading into
central Madrid. The blasts killed 191 people and injured nearly 1,800. Although this event may have affected voting in
the 2004 election (Bali 2007; Montalvo 2011), it is unlikely to account for my findings, as I demonstrate in Appendix
Table A-1.
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table 2: Effect of offshored jobs on incumbent vote shares, by municipality 2000-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable = PP vote share
Intensity of treatment (# of offshored jobs) -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Post period -6.135 -6.967 -6.916 -6.783
(0.121) (0.224) (0.332) (0.421)
Population (thousands) 0.018 0.016 0.012
(0.033) (0.035) (0.040)
Unemployment rate -0.173 -0.059
(0.504) (0.559)
Economic growth rate 0.041
(0.025)
Constant 17.372 21.156 21.608 20.866
(0.060) (0.704) (1.653) (1.895)
Observations 1885 378 378 333
R-squared 0.736 0.911 0.912 0.906
Number of municipalities 943 200 200 179
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
reported in Table 2. Offshoring events that produce more job losses have a larger reductive
effect on the government party’s vote share. The estimated effect of the "intensity of treatment"
indicator is statistically significant at the 99 percent level in all models. The typical offshoring
event in my sample generates 375 job losses. An offshoring event of this magnitude reduces the
incumbent’s vote share by 1.22 percentage points, on average. This constitutes more than a 10
percent decrease compared to the overall PP vote share in Catalonia in 2004. This is a non-trivial
outcome, particularly in a proportional representation system where every vote counts towards
the party’s share of seats in parliament. Furthermore, this result likely represents a lower bounds
estimate because the intensity of treatment indicator measures only the direct job losses from
offshoring and not the indirect job losses.15
Lower bounds estimates
There are several additional reasons why the magnitude of the treatment effects reported in Tables
1 and 2 may represent lower bound estimates. First, if I missed any offshoring events in my
coding efforts, a municipality might erroneously be included in the control group rather than
the treatment group. The estimated difference between the control and treatment groups would
consequently be biased downwards, underestimating the electoral effect of offshoring. Second,
the offshoring events I analyze above occur during a period of strong economic growth. Voters’
responses to offshoring may be more negative in a less vibrant economy. Third, Spain is a member
15Accurately estimating the number of indirect job losses for each offshoring event is difficult and fraught with error.
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of the European Union and as a result, the country’s exposure to the global economy lies outside
the national government’s direct control. Given this, Spanish voters may not punish incumbents
as severely for offshoring as voters in other countries where governments have more authority
over the national economy’s openness to globalization (Hellwig 2014).
Fourth, the economic impacts of a plant closure in one municipality may spill over into
nearby municipalities, thereby reducing the estimated magnitude of the ATT. More than 900
municipalities exist in Catalonia and although municipalities vary in size, they tend to be relatively
small. Municipalities’ size make them a theoretically-appropriate unit of analysis to identify the
electoral impact of offshoring’s local labor market effects. But their smallness also raises the
possibility of spillovers. If the economic impacts of a plant closure in one municipality spill over
into neighbouring municipalities, then some areas included in the control group may, in fact be,
(partially) treated, which would bias downwards any electoral effects of offshoring.
To test for this possibility, I identify all municipalities adjacent to the treated municipalities.
Using this geographic indicator, I exclude from the control group all municipalities that share
a border with a treated municipality and re-estimate the models from Table 1. These results
are reported in Appendix Table A-5. All of the estimated ATTs are larger when neighboring
municipalities are excluded from the control group. In model 1, the estimated treatment effect
increases by 1.44 percent. In model 2, the ATT increases by 6.72 percent; in model 3 the ATT
increases by 16.35 percent and in model 4 the ATT increases by 24.48 percent when treated
municipalities’ neighbours are excluded from the control group. These results suggest that the
effects of offshoring may spill over from treated municipalities to neighbouring municipalities.
However, any such spillovers bias downward the estimated impact of offshoring on incumbents’
vote shares.
Finally, the ATTs reported in Tables 1 and 2 may under-report voters’ discontent with
offshoring because incumbent governments take action to minimize their vote losses from
offshoring. Incumbent parties who visibly fight to stop firms moving abroad using the policy
tools at their disposal may face less of an electoral penalty for offshoring. As Jensen and Malesky
(2018) show, offering firms incentives to invest in an area can minimize the electoral costs to
politicians of failing to win investment. Incentives help incumbents claim credit for investment
and reduce blame if the investment does not materialize (Jensen and Malesky 2018). Incumbents
may similarly reduce the electoral costs of offshoring by offering firms incentives to stay onshore.
Anecdotal evidence shows that incumbents work hard to keep firms onshore. The Catalan
government, for example, considers offshoring potential as a condition for the award of subsidies.
And all regional governments meet with firms that are planning to close a plant in their jurisdiction.
These meetings typically involve discussions of ways to avert the closure and save jobs. In some
cases, the government’s efforts to keep firms onshore are successful. The Ford automotive plant
in Valencia remained in Spain after receiving generous economic benefits from the regional
government (Jofre-Monseny et al. 2018). Economic incentives were also successful in keeping
Seat’s production plant in Martorell, Spain (Jofre-Monseny et al. 2018).16
In other cases, however, the government’s attempts to keep firms onshore fail. In early 2002,
when the US-owned multinational, Lear, announced the closure of its electrical components
plant at Cervera, the Catalan government met with the company to discuss the closure. After the
meeting, a spokesperson for the Catalan government lamented that “the decision of the company
is final and the only thing that can be achieved [by the regional government] is to delay it for a few
16However, Seat ultimately decided to manufacture 10 percent of its Ibiza model in Bratislava, Slovakia.
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months or phase it over a relatively brief period” (Miguélez Lobo 2004). Although Lear received
economic incentives from the government, including several types of tax allowances, the Cervera
plant closed its doors on December 31, 2002 and moved production to Poland; 1,200 people lost
their jobs as a result.
Regardless of how successful governments are in keeping firms onshore, incumbents may get
credit with voters for trying to keep firms in the country. By offering firms incentives, incumbents
may effectively reduce the electoral penalty from offshoring. Because virtually all of the cases
in my sample involved efforts by government to keep firms onshore, the reported ATTs may
underestimate the full extent of the potential impact of offshoring on incumbents’ vote shares.
Although the results reported in Tables 1 and 2 may represent lower bound estimates of
offshoring’s impact on incumbents’ vote shares, they nevertheless are politically significant.
Politics is often a competition over tight margins (Margalit 2019, pp. 290) and the effect of
offshoring on the preferences of a narrow segment of voters may have an important impact on the
overall electoral outcome. The political significance of offshoring may lie not in reorienting the
allegiances of the general electorate, but rather in influencing the preferences of a narrow, yet
potentially consequential segment of voters.
Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, I generate two matched samples. First, I match municipalities that
experience an offshoring event with control municipalities that have similar shares of their labor
force employed in manufacturing in 1996.17 Second, I match municipalities that have similar
numbers of businesses in 1996. I generate 10 categories for each variable that reflect the sample’s
deciles. I match treated municipalities and control municipalities using these categories and
restrict matches to municipalities in the same employment category. These results are reported in
Appendix Table A-6.
The average treatment effect on the treated in the matched sample is statistically significant
and similar in magnitude to that in the unmatched sample. This finding indicates that munici-
palities’ different economic profiles do not account for the electoral consequences of offshoring.
Comparing municipalities with similar numbers of firms and similar number of people employed
in manufacturing, those that experienced an offshoring event display larger declines in incumbents’
vote shares than those that do not experience an offshoring event.
As a further robustness test, I move beyond Catalonia and examine voting behavior across the
entire country. I examine incumbent government parties’ vote shares in all of Spain’s provinces in
national parliamentary elections in years t = (2000, 2004, 2008, 2011). Provinces correspond with
national electoral districts; they are larger than municipalities but smaller than regions. Catalonia,
for example, contains four provinces.
As before, I use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. I rely exclusively on the
intensity of treatment indicator here because some provinces are treated multiple times - that is,
they experience multiple offshoring events between elections and this information is not captured
by a dummy treatment indicator.
Voters faced different incumbent government parties in the different election years. In 2004,
the center-right PP party was the incumbent. In 2011, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) was the incumbent. The difference in the incumbents’
17This year is the nearest pre-treatment year for which data are available at the municipal level.
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identity allows me to examine whether parties from different sides of the ideological spectrum
are punished similarly by voters for offshoring.
Despite the two parties’ different ideological positions, both were punished by voters for
offshoring, as reported in Appendix Table A-7. PSOE’s vote share fell between the 2008 and 2011
elections. In fact, PSOE suffered its worst electoral defeat to date in 2011 (Fernández-Albertos,
Kuo, and Balcells 2013). However, the party’s losses were relatively greater in provinces where
offshoring occurred.18 Similarly, PP’s vote losses were relatively greater in provinces where
offshoring occurred. For both incumbent parties, offshoring events that produced more job losses
had a larger reductive effect on their vote shares.
These results demonstrate that the Catalan findings generalize beyond the region. Voters who
experience a local offshoring event are more inclined to vote against the incumbent government
party, and do so irrespective of that party’s identity (Anderson 2007).
Regional Elections
Voters appear to blame the national government for local offshoring events. Do they also blame
regional governments? In the devolved autonomous regions of Spain, voters elect sub-national
governments that have decision-making powers over a range of policy areas. Given these powers,
voters may blame regional governments for local offshoring events, in addition to the national
government.
Regional governments serve as the first line of defense for workers facing dismissal due
to offshoring. Spanish labor law requires companies to inform the regional government of any
plans to collectively dismiss workers at a plant in the region. After receiving such a notification,
members of the regional government meet with representatives from the firm, often with the
aim of minimizing the number of job losses. Given the involvement of regional governments
in discussions about firms’ potential moves abroad, voters may subsequently blame them when
offshoring does occur.
Additionally, regional governments have decision-making powers over a range of relevant
policy areas (León 2014). For example, regional governments have considerable power over taxes,
expenditures, and active labor market policies (Queralt 2012; León 2014). Using these powers,
regional governments could provide incentives to keep firms onshore. Voters may consequently
view regional governments as being at least partially responsible for the relocation of production,
and consequently jobs, abroad.
Although regional elections in Catalonia are held using the same electoral rules as national
elections, regional elections typically take place in different years and turnout rates are generally
lower (Riera 2013). Dual voting is also common - that is, people vote for different parties in
national and regional elections (León 2014; Riera 2013). As a result, the patterns observed in
national elections may not emerge in regional elections.
Additionally, the composition of the regional government in Catalonia during the period
under investigation differed from the national government, which included only a single political
18To assess the empirical validity of the parallel trends assumption, I examine whether the PSOE vote share in
municipalities affected by offshoring between the 2004 and 2008 elections followed a similar trend to the control
municipalities in the years prior to the treatment. Reassuringly, trends in the PSOE party’s vote shares prior to 2008 are
strikingly parallel in treated and untreated municipalities, as illustrated in Appendix Figure A-2.
Incumbents Beware 15
party. In contrast, the regional government consisted of three parties. The Catalan Socialists
Party (PSC) obtained the largest number of votes but not seats in the 2003 regional parliamentary
election. In order to govern, the Catalan Socialists formed a coalition with two other parties:
Initiative for Catalonia-Greens (ICV) - the Catalan version of the national United Left (IU) party
- and Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), a nationalist party that advocates independence for
Catalonia.
The presence of multiple parties in the regional government blurs the lines of responsibility.
If citizens are to cast an “economic vote”, they must have “clarity of responsibilities” in terms
of which party is responsible for the relevant policy area (Powell and Whitten 1993). Voters
generally find it easiest to allocate blame for bad economic outcomes when a single party governs
(Powell 2000; Samuels and Hellwig 2010). Faced with a multi-party coalition government, voters
often have difficulty allocating blame (Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013; Powell and Whitten
1993). Consequently, the deleterious effects of offshoring on incumbent government parties’ vote
shares may not materialize in multi-party governments.
To test this, I again use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. I consider regional
parliamentary elections in Catalonia in years t = (2003, 2006). These elections occur during
Spain’s offshoring surge and predate the 2008 economic crisis, as well as the dramatic rise of
public support for independence and secessionist parties in Catalonia, which began in earnest
after 2010. The outcome of interest is the change in the incumbent government party’s vote
share. More precisely, let Ydit denote potential outcomes, where Y1it and Y0it indicate the pair
of potential vote shares that the party attains in municipality i at time t when exposed to the
treatment or the control condition between the two elections. Because there are three incumbent
government parties, there are three pairs of Y1it and Y0it.19 Following Duch and Stevenson
(2008), I estimate the three parties’ vote pairs separately. The full results are reported in the
Appendix Tables A-2, A-3 and A-4. The estimated ATTs from model 1 for all three parties are
displayed in Figure 1 with 99 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 1: Effect of offshoring on regional government parties’ vote shares, by municipality 2003-2006
19In May 2006, ERC left the government coalition over disagreements about the final draft of changes to the region’s
constitution. Their withdrawal left the government without a majority and forced the regional president to call an early
election. Although ERC left the coalition, I code it as being an incumbent government party for three reasons: first, it had
been in government since 2003. Second, the coalition ceased to government after ERC left. Third, voters likely evaluated
the ERC as being part of the incumbent government even after its departure.
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As illustrated in Figure 1, voters punished the largest coalition party, the Catalan Socialists
(PSC), most severely for offshoring. While PSC’s overall vote share fell between the 2003 and
2006 elections, their vote share fell by relatively more in treated municipalities.20 The average
treatment effect for PSC ranges from -1.7 to -2.8 percentage points across the four estimated
models.21 Note that this effect is generally larger than the estimated effect of offshoring on
national governments. The national PP party’s vote share fell by just 1.6 percentage points in
treated municipalities, on average, as reported in Table 1.
A similar pattern emerges from the intensity of treatment indicator, which measures the
number of jobs lost as a direct result of a local offshoring event. The coefficient on the intensity
of treatment indicator is larger for the regional party, PSC, than either of the national government
parties (PSOE and PP). For national parties, the magnitude of the effect of a single job loss from
offshoring in a treated municipality ranges from -0.002 to -0.004 percentage points. The effect is
nearly twice as large for the regional PSC party; it ranges from -0.007 to -0.011.22 These results
suggest voters attribute relatively more blame for local offshoring events to regional governments
than national governments. To know the full extent of globalization’s electoral impacts, it is
therefore essential to look beyond national elections to regional elections as well.
Among the three parties in the regional government, voters punished the Catalan Socialists
Party (PSC) most severely for offshoring. A lost of 250 jobs due to offshoring reduced the
PSC vote share by 2 percentage points in a treated municipality, on average.23 In contrast, 250
offshored jobs reduced the ICV party’s vote share by just 0.5 percentage points. Unlike its
coalition partners, ICV’s vote shares grew, on average, between the 2003 and 2006 regional
elections.24 Although ICV’s vote shares increased overall, the party did relatively less well in
municipalities that experienced offshoring. All but one of the ATTs is negative and statistically
significant at conventional levels. However, the magnitude of ICV’s losses were smaller than
PSC’s losses. The average treatment effect on ICV’s vote shares ranges from -0.41 to -0.75
percentage points across the four estimated models, which is just one-quarter of the estimated
effect of offshoring on PSC’s vote share.
Job losses from offshoring have no robust effect on the ERC party’s vote shares. On
average, the ERC party lost votes between the 2003 and 2006 elections. However, its losses
were similar in treated and control municipalities. None of the estimated ATTs are statistically
significant at conventional levels. Offshoring may have had little impact on this party’s vote
shares because it focuses primarily on the issue of Catalan independence. Voters who support
Catalan independence may do so for non-material reasons, such as identity (e.g Rodon and
20To assess the empirical validity of the parallel trends assumption, I examine whether the parties’ vote share in
municipalities affected by offshoring between the 2003 and 2006 elections followed a similar trend to the control
municipalities in the years prior to the treatment. Trends in the Catalan Socialists Party (PSC) party’s vote shares prior to
2006 are relatively parallel in treated and untreated municipalities, as illustrated in Appendix Figure A-3.
21The first model excludes time varying covariates (except a constant). The second model includes a control for
municipalities’ population. In model three, municipalities’ unemployment rate is included as an additional control variable.
Although unemployment does not have a robust effect on incumbent vote shares, offshoring events that generate job losses
do. Higher economic growth rates correlate with higher vote shares for PSC, as illustrated in model 4. The addition of
each control variable reduces the magnitude of the ATT but it remains negatively signed and statistically significant at
conventional levels across all models.
22The estimated coefficient on the intensity of treatment indicator is negatively signed and statistically significant at
the 95 percent level in all models.
23The sample’s mean number of job losses is 250.
24Minor coalition parties like ICV can sometimes increase their vote share when that of the larger coalition parties
decline (Duch and Stevenson 2013; Fortunato and Stevenson 2013).
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Guinjoan 2018), and consequently they may vote for pro-independence political parties like ERC
irrespective of local economic shocks.
The varied effects of offshoring on the regional parties’ vote shares is consistent with theories
of economic voting in coalition government. These theories are primarily developed and tested at
the national level. In national elections, not all parties in a multi-party government are expected to
share the same electoral fate (Martin 2018). Instead, the largest party in government is generally
believed to be the party that will be held most to account for poor economic outcomes (Kayser and
Peress 2012; Fortunato and Stevenson 2013). In this sub-national context, Catalan voters punished
the largest coalition party in the regional government for local job losses due to offshoring. From
2003-2006, the Catalan Socialists Party held the chief executive position and occupied the most
cabinet portfolios. The party also controlled the Treasury Department, which oversees subsidies
and tax incentives for firms. Given this, he Catalan Socialists Party (PSC) arguably had the
greatest ability to keep firms onshore, which may help to explain why voters punished it most
severely for offshoring.
These novel sub-national results make an important contribution to understanding how
globalization affects elections at different levels of government. The sub-national results contribute
to the literature on dual accountability (Rodden andWibbels 2011), and the clarity of responsibility
literature, which argues that economic voting is conditional on voters’ ability to assign blame. In
this case, voters assigned blame for offshoring to the largest coalition party who had the greatest
influence over potentially relevant policies, including subsidies and tax incentives.
Descriptive Survey Evidence
The difference-in-differences results suggest a causal relationship exists between offshoring and
voting behavior. To probe the plausibility of these results, I fielded a nation-wide survey in Spain
in October 2018. The survey was administered to 1,000 respondents by Netquest using an online
commercial panel.25 The sample was selected using age, gender, and province quotas in order to
ensure a nationally-representative sample of respondents.
Twenty-two percent of respondents said that the regional government deserves “a great deal
of blame” for offshoring. Twenty-five percent of respondents said that the national government
deserves “a great deal of blame” for offshoring. Fifty-four percent of respondents said offshoring
would make them less likely to vote for the incumbent government party in the next national
election.26 One in three respondents said they would be much less likely to vote for the national
government party if a business in their local area closed to move abroad and the closure of this
business resulted in job losses. In short, the survey results illustrate that many voters do in fact
blame incumbents for offshoring and local offshoring events may influence their vote choice in
subsequent elections.
Twice as many respondents identified offshoring as an event that would make them less
likely to vote for the incumbent government party than the closure of a local business to move
25Netquest is certified by ISO 26362 standards for online access panels. See the Appendix for the survey questions in
English.
26Unfortunately, the survey did not include the equivalent question for the regional government incumbent party due
to unforeseen budget constraints.
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Figure 2: Which event would make you less likely to vote for the incumbent?
to a different part of Spain, as illustrated in Figure 2.27 This finding is consistent with the
difference-in-differences results reported above. Recall that changes in vote shares over time
are compared across two groups of municipalities: 1) treated municipalities that experienced
job losses due to offshoring and 2) control municipalities that experienced job losses for other
reasons. The results suggest that voters punish incumbents relatively more severely for job losses
that occurred because of offshoring than job losses that happened for other reasons.
Is Offshoring Different?
When comparing voters’ reactions to different types of job losses, it is important to take into
account governments’ policy responses. Governments may respond differently to different types
of job losses. Job losses due to maleficence or bankruptcy, for example, may elicit a different
governmental reaction than job losses due to globalization. In the United States, for instance, the
government provides additional economic assistant to workers who lose their jobs because of
globalization via the Trade Adjustment Assistance program. This supplementary aid is available
only to workers who lost their jobs because of globalization and not for any other reason. If
governments’ policy responses vary according to the source of the job losses, then comparing
voters’ reactions to different types of job losses may capture their reactions to government policy
rather than the cause of the job loss per se.
To avoid this pitfall and further investigate the prospect that voters respond differently to
offshored jobs, I conduct an additional difference-in-differences estimation using only job losses
that elicited identical governmental responses. To do this, I compile new data from Spain’s
applications to the European Globalization Adjustment Fund (EGF). The EGF is run by the
European Commission and provides co-funding to help EU member-states assist unemployed
persons. It became operational in 2007 and initially funded programs to assist workers displaced
as a result of globalization, defined as a substantial increase in imports, a serious shift in trade of
goods or services, a rapid decline of market share in a given sector, or the offshoring of activities.
27See the Appendix for the exact survey question (in English) and all available answers. The most common response,
chosen by 49 percent of respondents, was "none of the above".
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In 2008, the eligibility criteria were expanded to include redundancies resulting from the global
economic crisis.
Using these data, I hold constant the governments’ policy response to job losses from varied
sources. In reaction to all of these job losses, the Spanish government: 1) applied for and received
EU funds to help the displaced workers; and 2) contributed additional money from the national
government’s budget to assist unemployed persons. As a result, any observed changes in vote
shares can be attributed to the job losses themselves rather than any (in)action by the government.
Additionally, these data allow me to compare voters’ responses to offshoring-induced job losses
and job losses from other international sources, such as foreign imports and the 2008 global
financial crisis. This comparison helps to isolate the impact of offshoring from voters’ more
general concerns about globalization and economic openness.
I identify and geo-locate jobs lost due to offshoring and jobs lost for other reasons using
information fromSpain’s applications for EGF funds and related EuropeanCommission documents,
which specify the precise reason for the job losses. For example, the European Commission noted
in their decision to award Spain 10 million Euros from the European Globalization Adjustment
Fund in 2008 that, “the production of motor vehicle components were relocated to the tax free
zone of Tangier (Morocco). This materialized in a Memorandum of Understanding signed the
day after the closure of the Delphi factory in Puerto Real (Spain) between Delphi (USA) and the
Government of Morocco.” (EC 2008, p. 2). I code the 1,521 jobs lost as a result of the plant
closure as being due to offshoring.28 In contrast, some of the job losses have nothing to do with
offshoring. For example, Spain received EGF funds for redundancies in industries producing
construction materials, such as doors and marble floor tiles. These job losses were the result
of the 2008 global financial crisis’ impact on Spain’s construction industry, which suffered as
the rate of new homes being built in Spain fell steeply. I code these job losses as occurring for
reasons other than offshoring.
As before, I use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated. I consider national parliamentary elections in year t = (2008, 2011)
because the EGF became operational in 2007 and its eligibility criteria remained constant over the
entire period from 2008 to 2011. In 2011, the incumbent government party was the left-leaning
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, PSOE). I examine PSOE’s
vote shares in national parliamentary elections for i = (1, ..., 51) provinces.29 For each province, I
calculate the number of job losses that occurred due to offshoring and the number of job losses
that occurred for other reasons between the 2008 and 2011 elections. The results are reported in
Table 3.
While job losses due to offshoring significantly reduce the incumbent government party’s
vote share, job losses for other reasons do not. This distinction holds when the number of
offshored jobs is included in models by itself and also when included together with the number of
jobs lost for other reasons. In this sample, the average number of job losses from offshoring in a
treated province is 523. An offshoring-induced loss of 523 jobs reduces the incumbent’s vote
share by 1.6 percentage points, on average. This sized vote loss is equivalent to a 5.6 percent
reduction in PSOE’s total vote share in 2011.
28This case is not included in the sample because it occurred before the 2008 election.
29I use provinces as my unit of analysis here because all of the job losses reported in EGF applications between 2008
and 2011 for Catalonia were due to offshoring. In order to be able to compare the varied effects of different types of job
losses on incumbent vote shares, I must therefore move beyond Catalonia to the nation as a whole.
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table 3: Effect of different types of job losses on incumbent vote shares, by province 2008-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable = PSOE vote share
Offshored job losses -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Other job losses 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Post period -14.76 -14.89 -14.77 -14.79 -14.85
(0.356) (0.373) (0.370) (0.428) (0.715)
Population (thousands) 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Economic growth rate -0.014
(0.119)
Constant 43.47 43.47 43.47 42.83 42.89
(0.169) (0.175) (0.170) (2.742) (2.692)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104
R-squared 0.975 0.973 0.975 0.975 0.975
Number of provinces 52 52 52 52 52
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
While offshored jobs reduce the incumbent’s vote share, jobs lost for other reasons do not.
The point estimate on the intensity of treatment variable equal to the number of jobs lost for other
reasons is close to zero and fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significant in any of the
estimated models. Perhaps the large standard errors reflect the fact that the variable includes jobs
losses from various sources and voters react differently to different types of job losses.
These results are consistent with findings from the United States. Margalit (2011) finds
that layoffs due to offshoring are correlated with a reduction in the incumbent President’s vote
shares between the 2000 election, won by Republican George W. Bush, and the 2004 election
when Bush ran as the incumbent. In contrast, job losses caused by other forms of international
competition, such as imports, are not. It is striking that similar results emerge in two different
settings: presidential elections in the United States and parliamentary elections in Spain. In both
settings, offshoring-related job losses engender a larger anti-incumbent vote than job losses due
to other international sources. These results are also broadly consistent with findings reported by
Di Tella and Rodrik (2020). In a survey conducted in the United States, they find that job losses
due to offshoring elicit greater demand for government action than job losses due to other factors.
If voters want governments to do relatively more in response to offshoring-induced lay-offs, the
absence of such a response may lead voters to cast an anti-incumbent vote.
What else might explain voters’ varied reactions to different types of job losses? The data
used in Table 3 rule out one possible explanation, namely varied governmental responses to
job losses from different sources. Having ruled out government policy as a potential answer,
the question remains: why do voters appear to punish incumbents more severely for offshoring-
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induced job losses than for other types of job losses? I offer several possible suggestions here but
leave to future research the task of investigating their relative explanatory power.
First, voters may view offshoring as a preventable loss whereas job losses from other sources,
such as a mismanaged company, are not. Because governments can (and do) provide firms with
generous economic incentives to keep jobs onshore, voters may consequently view offshoring as a
result of government inaction and vote against the incumbent government party in the subsequent
election.
Second, the costs of job losses from offshoring may be higher than the costs of job losses
from other sources. Offshored workers typically have a different age and/or skill profile than other
unemployed persons. In Spain, for example, workers made unemployed because of offshoring
in the textile industry were mostly women, often middle-aged with relatively low qualifications
(Miguélez Lobo 2004). The possibility of retraining to obtain jobs under similar conditions was
limited. To obtain new jobs after theirs moved abroad, many workers had to accept worse pay or
temporary jobs (Miguélez Lobo 2004). If offshored workers face relatively higher costs from
becoming unemployed, then equal amounts of government compensation may fail to appease
them at the same rate it does for other citizens who lost their jobs for different reasons.
Third, different types of job losses may have varied labor market effects. If production
moves to a new location within a country, rather than abroad, suppliers may continue to exist. As
a result, fewer jobs will be lost when a plant relocates production to a different part of the country,
as compared to a foreign country. Furthermore, jobs that move abroad are not coming back. In
contrast, jobs that move to a different part of the country are “recoverable”. People can follow
the production by moving to a different part of the country and seeking re-employment. This
may help to explain why twice as many respondents identified offshoring as an event that would
make them less likely to vote for the incumbent than the closure of a local business to move to a
different part of Spain.
Finally, the media’s coverage of offshoring may elicit a disproportionate voter reaction.
When covering offshoring, the media often explicitly identifies foreign competition as the cause
of the job losses and sometimes even names a specific foreign country (Margalit 2011, 184).
In 90 percent of the cases in my sample, I could identify the country to which production was
moving from media reports alone.30 The fact that offshoring is closely associated with “others”
may trigger voters’ nationalism and/or ethnocentrism (e.g. Margalit 2011; Mansfield and Mutz
2013). While a perception that foreigners are taking away “our jobs” may stir nationalist or
ethnocentric sentiments, it is not obvious why this would necessarily lead to an anti-incumbent
vote. Further research is needed to explore this and other potential mechanisms that may uniquely
link offshoring to anti-incumbent voting.
Conclusion
Offshoring is one of the most controversial aspects of modern-day globalization. Yet, to date,
it has been unclear how offshoring impacts democratic elections. Understanding the political
consequences of offshoring is an important and timely objective because it is poised to become
30The most frequent destination was China followed by Eastern Europe (i.e. Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic, and
Poland).
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an ever more urgent issue for elected leaders as technology facilitates the move of high-skilled
jobs abroad.
Using novel data on offshoring and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I find
that voters punish the political parties in government when businesses move production abroad.
Incumbent government parties lose more votes in municipalities where a plant relocates production
abroad between elections than in municipalities without such an event. This result holds for
different elections, in different years, for different incumbent parties, and at different levels of
government. In both national and sub-national elections, voters punish incumbent government
parties for offshoring and parties’ vote shares fall as the number of jobs lost due to offshoring
increases. In multi-party coalition governments, voters disproportionately punish the largest party
in government for offshoring. Incumbent government parties of various ideological stripes lose
more votes in municipalities where production relocated internationally between elections than in
municipalities without such an event.
These results are striking because they emerge in Spain – a country with party-centered
electoral competition, multi-member districts, closed party lists, and proportional electoral rules
(PR). Proportional electoral rules improve representation but generally do so at the expense of
accountability (Lijphart 1984, 1994; Powell 2000). Accountability exists when there is: 1) clarity
of responsibility for political outcomes, and: 2) voters can effectively sanction those responsible
for the outcomes (Powell 2000). Plurality electoral systems tend to score highly on these two
criteria while PR systems do less well. Yet, even in a closed-list PR system like Spain, I find that
voters punish incumbent government parties for offshoring.
It is improbable that these results are unique to the Spanish context. If fact, Spain arguably
represents a "least-likely" case (e.g. Odell 2001; Levy 2007). Spain has some of the toughest
employment protection regulations in the developed world. Spanish labor law makes it difficult for
firms to lay-off workers and workers that are laid-off receive generous compensation (Menendez
2010). Unemployed workers have the right to a minimum severance payment equivalent to
20 days of salary per year of service and, in practice, higher severance payments are usually
agreed (Menendez 2010). Unemployed persons can also take advantage of Spain’s generous
active labor market policies, which include retraining and relocation assistance (OECD 2007).
These programs help protect Spanish workers from the costs of offshoring. As a result, voters in
Spain may not punish incumbents as severely for offshoring as voters in other countries where
compensation programs are less generous.31 Empirically assessing the generalizability of the
results of this study is an important task for future research.
Economic globalization has significant implications for politics and, as this study shows,
these implications extend beyond the United States to democracies with other types of electoral
institutions, such as Spain. It is striking that in high-functioning democracies, offshoring decisions
taken by multinational corporations headquartered in foreign countries can influence elections.
This finding suggests that, in today’s era of globalization, all politics are indeed global.
31The fact that voters punish incumbents for offshoring despite Spain’s generous unemployment programs raises
questions about the efficacy of compensation for offsetting the costs of globalization. On this point, see Rickard (2019).
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